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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OPEN ATTENDANCE—THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
OF FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS IN
LAW SCHOOL STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION
It is a long established principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence that the
loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes an irreparable injury.1 At the
same time, many people and organizations throughout the United States
recognize homosexuality as an interest worthy of legal protection.2
Oftentimes, however, the desire to protect homosexuals from discrimination
conflicts with the First Amendment rights of groups or people who disapprove
of homosexual activity. In particular, universities all over the country are
beginning to realize just how difficult it is to fight discrimination against
homosexuals while maintaining respect for the free speech rights of all of their
students.3 Over the past several years, many schools have endured struggles
over such issues, including Arizona State University, the University of
California’s Hastings College of Law, Ohio State University, the University of
Minnesota, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Shippensburg
University, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Texas Tech
University, and Washburn University.4
The First Amendment implications of protecting homosexual rights are
becoming particularly prominent in America’s public law schools.5 Many

1. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding a Texas law making
intimate sexual contact between consenting adults of the same sex illegal to be unconstitutional as
a violation of the rights of liberty deriving from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding a state law
banning gay marriage violated the Massachusetts Constitution).
3. See Kathleen Murphy, Can Religious Groups Exclude Non-Believers?, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
18, 2005, § 2, at 12 (detailing recent conflicts between religious organizations and various
schools over non-discrimination policies).
4. Id.; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 2006).
5. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70
(2006) (holding the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First Amendment rights of law
schools that wished to prevent military recruiters from interviewing on campus because of their
stance on homosexuality); Suherwanto v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 230 Fed. App’x
211, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (homosexual student allegedly asked by a law school dean to leave the
university because his sexual orientation threatened to “destroy the reputation of the law school if
1249
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major members of the legal community have joined those supporting the cause
of homosexual rights.6 Hundreds of law schools have adopted policies
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation since the 1970s,
and, in 1990, the American of Association Law Schools (AALS) unanimously
voted to embrace sexual orientation as a protected category, which led even
more schools to institute some variety of an anti-discrimination policy that
aimed to prevent homosexuals from facing inequality.7 The AALS bylaws
include a non-discrimination and affirmative action policy in its membership
requirements that states in part that member schools are to provide equality of
educational opportunity for all students without discrimination based upon
sexual orientation.8 Further, a member school must attempt to pursue policies
that give its students and graduates equal opportunity to obtain employment
he remained a student”); Walker, 453 F.3d at 858 (student organization’s status revoked over
policies on homosexuality); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at
*3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006) (student organization’s recognition refused because of policies on
homosexuality); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856–57 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (student
challenged university policy that required prior permission for exercising free speech rights
outside of certain “free speech area[s]”).
6. See, e.g., Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 52 (explaining that “(FAIR) is an association of law
schools. . . . Its declared mission [includes] . . . ‘opposing discrimination and vindicat[ing] the
rights of institutions of higher education.’ FAIR members have adopted policies expressing their
opposition to discrimination based on, among other factors, sexual orientation.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also infra, note 7 and accompanying text.
7. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224–25 (3d.
Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Reply Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts III,
IV, V, and VI of Pl.’s Compl., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 4:05-cv-04070-GPM, 2005
WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2005), 2005 WL 2840229; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 652–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has taken sides with
homosexuals in the “culture wars” as evidenced by job interviews at America’s law schools).
Justice Scalia added:
[A]nyone who wishes to interview job applicants at virtually any of the Nation’s law
schools. . .may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican; because he is
an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country
club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-animal
fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if the interviewer should wish not to
be an associate or partner of an applicant because he disapproves of the applicant's
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge which the Association of American
Law Schools requires all its member schools to exact from job interviewers: “assurance of
the employer’s willingness” to hire homosexuals.
Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting derisively that the opinion
in Lawrence was “the product of a Court [and] a law-profession culture, that has largely signed
on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . . [T]he American Association of Law Schools (to which
any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from membership any school that refuses
to ban from its job-interview facilities a law firm . . . that does not wish to hire . . . a person who
openly engages in homosexual conduct.”).
8. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, § 6-4 (a), (b)
(1990).
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without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by expressing to all
employers its “firm expectation that the employer will observe the principle of
equal opportunity.”9 Thus, all member schools (which, as of January 2006,
comprised 168 American law schools, both public and private)10 have at the
very least voiced a belief in the importance of protecting their students from
discrimination based on sexual orientation through their membership in AALS,
even if they have not explicitly adopted their own non-discrimination policy
assuring homosexual rights.
Highlighting this ongoing tension between the First Amendment and
homosexuality in the world of law schools, a new high-profile clash
commenced at the Southern Illinois University School of Law, pitting the
school’s anti-discrimination policy against its chapter of the Christian Legal
Society’s claims for expressive association.11 In Christian Legal Society v.
Walker, the United States Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois,
with direction to enter grant of the Christian Legal Society’s (CLS) motion for
a preliminary injunction against Southern Illinois University (SIU).12 SIU had
revoked CLS’s university status for alleged violation of SIU antidiscrimination policies based upon a CLS policy that prevents affirmed
homosexuals from becoming voting members.13 Because the case emerged
from an American Bar Association and AALS accredited law school, and as
such schools have similar anti-discrimination policies or are bound by the
AALS policy, this decision has the potential to monumentally impact both the
First Amendment protections, practices, and policies and the fight against
homosexual discrimination in law school student organizations all across the
nation.
This Comment will first analyze the history of the major legal quarrels
affecting protection of First Amendment rights of expressive association
against the issue of exclusion of homosexuals from private organizations. This
will place an examination of the Walker decision in its proper contextual
framework. The Comment will then conclude with the Author’s analysis of
the decision’s potential impact on public law schools and what steps these
schools can take to deal with discrimination against homosexuals in their
student organizations without violating the First Amendment rights of those
groups.

9. Id.
10. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 2007 HANDBOOK 1, 19–22 (2007)
available at http://www.aals.org/about_memberschools.php.
11. Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006); Walker, 2005 WL
1606448.
12. Walker, 453 F.3d at 867.
13. Id. at 858.
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I. THE MAJOR EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION CASES LEADING TO WALKER14
Generally speaking, First Amendment litigation did not become a part of
the Supreme Court’s caseload until after World War I,15 and the protections of
the amendment were not applied against the states until 1925.16 Still, the first
major case involving the right of assembly reached the Court in 1876, where in
United States v. Cruikshank the Court stated in dictum that the right to
assemble peaceably:
is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and
guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
17
grievances.

It was more than eighty years later, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, that the Court first determined the right to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas (described first in Cruikshank) resided in
the Due Process Clause, stating, “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause . . . which embraces freedom of
speech.”18 Read in this light, freedom of association becomes “a necessary
precondition to free speech” even though it is “not among the Constitution’s
explicit protections.”19 As such a “precondition,” there could be no
meaningful value to the right of assembly if it did not also include the
supplementary right to gather together to express and propagate ideas. It is this
precondition to the right of assembly with which this Comment is concerned.

14. There are, of course, many cases decided by the Supreme Court that have shaped the
right of expressive association. This Comment has not undertaken to give a complete history of
those cases. Rather, it is merely an attempt to give a brief outline of the right of expressive
association and those cases that are particularly important to the issues arising in Walker.
15. MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA
LAW 4 (7th ed. 2005).
16. Id.
17. 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
18. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
19. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 649–50 (2002). As
Mazzone points out, there were other earlier cases where the Court intimated that the Constitution
might contain a right to free association. Id. at 650–51. See, e.g., Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234,
245, 250–51 (1957) (“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall
have the right to engage in political expression and association.”); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 197–99 (1957) (“Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of . . . assembly. . . . Abuses of the investigative process . .
. [are] even more harsh when it is past . . . associations that are disclosed and judged.”); Schware
v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957) (holding New Mexico could not
prevent a former member of the Communist Party from practicing law merely because of his past
association).
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The Court has held that the right to expressive association is not absolute,20
and thus, litigation in this area usually turns on the balance of where the right
of association ends and the government’s right to regulate activity begins. This
is a question of determining the point where laws meant to assert a government
interest interfere with the rights of a group that has gathered together to engage
in First Amendment activity. There are at least four ways in which a group’s
right to expressive association can be impinged,21 but this Comment is most
concerned with only one variety—where the government imposes a burden on
an association that makes it more difficult or impossible for the group to
express the message it wishes to promulgate.22 The following cases highlight
the Court’s attempt to reach the balance between the government’s right to
regulate associative discrimination and the First Amendment rights of its
citizens in this regard.
A.

An Initial Foray: Healy

A case that was quite similar to Walker emerged in 1972 in Healy v.
James, when Central Connecticut State College (Central Connecticut)
attempted to bar a student organization from access to its campus because the
organization members’ beliefs were not consistent with school policy.23 In
Healy, a group of students attempted to organize a local chapter of Students for
a Democratic Society (SDS) at Central Connecticut.24 The school was worried
about the group’s affiliation with the national branch of SDS.25 SDS stated it
would not be affiliated with the national organization of SDS and would
instead be “completely independent.”26 The Student Affairs Committee voted
to approve the request for official recognition, but the President of the College
rejected this vote and decided not to grant SDS official recognition.27 He ruled
that SDS’s philosophy was adverse to Central Connecticut policies and that its
independence from the national organization was suspect,28 concluding that
recognition should not be given to any organization that “openly repudiates”

20. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
21. See Mazzone, supra note 19, at 651–55. The government interferes with a group’s right
of expressive association when its actions constitutes a burden or denial to an individual (or
group) of benefits that increases the costs associated with membership because of associational
ties, when it imposes a requirement of associational membership to receive a benefit from the
government, and when the government uses a group of citizens to advance the government’s own
desired expression. Id.
22. Id.
23. 408 U.S. 169, 174–76 (1972).
24. Id. at 172.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 173–74.
28. Healy, 408 U.S. at 174–75.
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Central Connecticut’s interest in and commitment to “academic freedom.”29
SDS filed suit against Central Connecticut, with the complaint alleging denial
of First Amendment rights of expression and association.30
Justice Powell’s unanimous opinion in favor of SDS reversed both the trial
court and Second Circuit’s decisions dismissing the case.31 The Court
acknowledged Central Connecticut’s refusal to recognize SDS would amount
to an abridgment of the SDS’s First Amendment right to free association if
recognition was denied without justification.32 Central Connecticut did not
argue it had a proper justification for infringing SDS’s rights, but instead
claimed that denial of recognition did not constitute a violation of SDS’s rights
because it could still meet off of campus, could still distribute written materials
off the campus, and could still meet with each other on campus in an informal
capacity as individuals—they simply could not do so as a universityrecognized chapter of SDS.33 The Court was willing to concede that Central
Connecticut had not directly interfered with SDS’s fundamental First
Amendment rights, but it rejected the idea that the Constitution’s protections
are limited only to such direct interference.34 Rather, the Constitution also
prevents “more subtle governmental interference.”35 Thus, Justice Powell
ordered the case to be remanded, emphasizing the Court’s “dedication to the
principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is
founded.”36

29. Id. at 175–76. The president’s finding that the SDS was not compatible with university
interest in academic freedom was based primarily upon the university’s “Statement on Rights,
Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students,” which was referred to as the “Student Bill of
Rights.” In particular, Part V of that statement held:
College students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support
causes by orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have the right to deprive
others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, to damage
the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to
interfere with the rights of others.
See id. at 175 n.5. Apparently, the president believed SDS would not comply with some aspect of
this statement.
30. Id. at 177.
31. Id. at 194.
32. Id. at 181.
33. Healy, 408 U.S. at 182–83.
34. Id. at 183.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 194.
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The Court Narrows the Right of Expressive Association

Until the 1980s, the Court was usually quite protective of the rights of
private groups or individuals to associate with those they wished.37 Starting in
1984, however, in three successive cases, the Court narrowed the scope of
protection offered to such private groups by the right of expressive
association.38
1.

Roberts

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Jaycees sued government officials
from the state of Minnesota because its Human Rights Act prohibited sex
discrimination in places of public accommodation, arguing that forcing them to
accept women as members violated their First Amendment rights.39 Justice
Brennan authored the 7–0 decision reversing the Eighth Circuit and finding
that the Minnesota anti-discrimination law did not violate the Jaycees’ First
Amendment rights.40
The Court did find that the Jaycees were entitled to First Amendment
protection because of the many civic, charitable, lobbying, and fundraising
activities in which they engaged.41 Flowing from these protected activities, the
right of expressive association was “plainly implicated” by the Jaycees’
lawsuit.42 In fact, Justice Brennan opined that the Minnesota law clearly was
an infringement upon the Jaycees’ associational rights because
[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept

37. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (holding that nonunion teachers in a public school could not be required to finance the expressive activities of the
union); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (striking an Illinois law that prohibited voting
in the primary of one party within twenty-three months of voting in different party’s primary);
Healy, 408 U.S. at 194; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960) (teachers in Arkansas
challenged a state law requiring disclosure of all memberships to which the teacher had belonged
or regularly contributed within the preceding five years as a condition of employment, and the
majority held this infringed their rights to free association, even though the state had an interest in
ensuring it had hired qualified educators); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
466 (1958) (holding that a state court order requiring the NAACP to divulge its membership lists
violated the NAACP’s members of their right to freedom of association).
38. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984). The Author has omitted discussion of Rotary because the Court’s analysis was
substantially similar to Roberts and further discussion would be largely repetitive.
39. 468 U.S. at 612. The Jaycees also claimed that the law violated their right to intimate
association, but this Comment focuses solely on the expressive association claim. See id. at 618.
40. Id. at 612. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision.
Id. at 631.
41. Id. at 626–27.
42. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the
43
original members to express only those views that brought them together.

Justice Brennan quickly pointed out, however, that the mere existence of
associational rights was not dispositive, because the “[t]he right to associate for
expressive purposes is not . . . absolute.”44 If a state can survive strict scrutiny
by showing it infringed on First Amendment rights to serve a compelling
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas and cannot be achieved
through means significantly less intrusive on associational freedom, the law
can survive.45
In this case, the Court found all three elements of strict scrutiny were
satisfied and thus rejected the Jaycees’ claim. First, the Court found that
Minnesota clearly had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against women in places of public accommodation that could trump the impact
the law might have on the Jaycees’ First Amendment rights.46 Second, the law
was content neutral, both facially and as applied, and thus there were no
concerns that the state’s goal in fighting discrimination was related to the
suppression of ideas.47 Finally, the Court was also convinced that Minnesota
was attempting to advance its interest in the least restrictive means possible.48
Particularly important to this last finding was the Court’s contention that the
Jaycees had been unable to demonstrate that the law actually worked to impose
any kind of “serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive
association.”49
Specifically, the court was unconvinced that the many civic, charitable,
lobbying, fundraising activities, or the messages of the Jaycees would actually
be impeded simply by admitting women. The Jaycees had long allowed
women to share in its views and participate in various Jaycees’ activities, thus
rejecting “sexual stereotyping” without substantial proof that “by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or
impact of the organization’s speech.”50 In light of this analysis, the Court
found that the Minnesota law survived strict scrutiny and it rejected the
Jaycees’ challenge.51

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 623.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623–24.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 631.
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New York State Club

The actual decision in New York State Club Association v. City of New
York was not earth shattering in the wake of Roberts and Rotary; after those
decisions it was little surprise the Court held that a New York City ordinance
that prohibited racial, religious, or sexual discrimination by certain private
athletic clubs with at least 400 members did not violate the First Amendment
right of expressive association.52 Justice White’s majority opinion avoided the
strict scrutiny analysis from Roberts and Rotary, however, relying largely on
the fact that the challenging clubs were unable to show that the ordinance
would in any way prevent them from “advocat[ing] public or private
viewpoints,” and that any club that wanted to keep out individuals who did not
share its views still could do so, because “the Law erects no obstacle to this . . .
[but] merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other
specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city
considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining membership.”53
New York State Club mattered not for what the Court decided about the
clubs themselves, but because, for the first time, the Court enunciated what a
litigant would have to do to win on a claim of expressive association: “an
association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive
purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly
as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same
sex, for example, or the same religion.”54 If an association cannot show that an
anti-discrimination law prevents it from keeping out those “who do not share
the views that the club’s members wish to promote,” the law being challenged
does not violate the First Amendment and the group will have to abide by the
regulation.55
C. The First Clash Between Expressive Association and Homosexuality:
Hurley
The year 1995 witnessed the right of expressive association’s first highprofile clash with homosexuality. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, a unanimous court held that a Massachusetts law
that required the organizers of a private parade to include an association of
homosexual marchers it had refused to admit violated the First Amendment
because it forced the organizers to impart a message they did not wish to
convey.56 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter rejected any notion that a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
(1995).

N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1988).
Id. at 13.
Id.
See id.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559
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parade was not expressive activity,57 and thus, when Massachusetts forced the
parade to include the contingent of homosexual marchers, it “violate[d] the
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”58
This holding reinforced the idea that Justice White’s test from New York
State Club—whether a group could show its message had actually been
impinged—had become the Court’s chief consideration in ruling on claims of
expressive association. It also signified a shift away from the limitations on
expressive association represented by Roberts, Rotary, and New York State
Club.
Of particular importance was the Court’s reluctance to require that the
association articulate a specific message that would be impaired.59 In fact, the
parade council never identified how including the homosexual marchers in its
parade would impair its message, or even what that message was, but the Court
was content to find that the probable message the council disfavored was “not
difficult to identify.”60 Thus, Hurley was particularly sweeping because the
claimants were not required to identify their intended message or how the
presence of homosexuals impaired that message. At the time, Hurley seemed
to stand for the idea that Justice White’s language of New York State Club61
had enabled the Court to greatly expand the protections of expressive
association.
D. The Boy Scouts Usher in the Dale-era of Expressive Association
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale is probably the most important expressive
association case to date.62 In Dale, an openly gay assistant scoutmaster
brought suit under a New Jersey public accommodations law that prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation after the Boy Scouts kicked him out
of the organization because he was a homosexual.63 Writing for a 5–4
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the law violated the Boy Scouts’
rights of expressive association and the Scouts could not be forced to admit
homosexual members.64

57. Id. at 559, 568.
58. Id. at 573.
59. Id. at 569 (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection.”).
60. Id. at 574–75 (“The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality
to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some
other reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade.”).
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
63. Id. at 643–44.
64. Id. at 642–44.
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The Court noted initially that even though forced inclusion of unwanted
individuals can infringe on a group’s freedom of expressive association, the
right to expressive association is not absolute and could be abrogated by
regulations that survive strict scrutiny.65 Thus, to analyze a claimed violation
of expressive association, a group must first show that it engages in expressive
association, though the group does not have to specifically be an “advocacy
group . . . .”66 Because this standard of “engag[ing] in expressive association”
is so broad, the Court had no problem finding that the Boy Scouts engaged in
expressive association.67
Once a group has made this threshold showing, the Court analyzes whether
the forced inclusion of the unwanted individual significantly affects the
group’s ability to promote its views either publicly or privately.68 In this case,
that analysis required the Court to “explore, to a limited extent, the nature of
the Boy Scouts’ view of homosexuality.”69 This “limited extent” was quite
restricted indeed; the Court merely quoted the Boy Scouts’ position on the
issue from the Scouts’ own brief—that they taught that homosexual conduct
was not “morally straight” and they did not want to “to promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,”70—and then the Court exercised
almost complete deference to the claim. The Court stated, “We accept the Boy
Scouts’ assertion. We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the
Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.”71 Having accepted the
Boy Scouts’ claims of what its view of homosexuality was, it was no surprise
that the Court also accepted the contention that admitting Mr. Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly impair the ability to express its
opinion that homosexual behavior was not legitimate: “As we give deference
to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must
also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression.”72
The Court’s acceptance of the Boy Scouts’ claim of infringement was
based on finding that allowing Dale to be a scoutmaster “would, at the very
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and

65. Id. at 648.
66. Id.
67. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 651 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
71. Id. The Court did go on to recount various pieces of evidence showing the Boy Scouts
disapproved of homosexuality to demonstrate the sincerity of their belief, but it seems clear this
was not a necessary step. See id. at 651–53.
72. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior.”73 Just as how in Hurley
the presence of GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have
interfered with the parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point
of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely
interfere with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view contrary
74
to its beliefs.

The Court refused to alter its finding based on claims that not all members of
the Boy Scouts agreed with the official position, because “the First
Amendment simply does not require that every member of a group agree on
every issue . . . .”75 Rather, the official position of a group is the one that is
“sufficient” to merit the protections of the First Amendment.76
Having found the law would infringe on the Boy Scouts’ rights, the Court
moved to the last step in the analysis of an expressive association claim—
determining if the state interest supported the infringement on the group’s
expressive association.77 Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the Court largely
sidestepped the issue of whether the protection of homosexuals against
discrimination constituted a compelling state interest. Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted how the Court had found the state interest in Roberts and Rotary to be
compelling, indicating that those cases had turned on the nature of the state
claim, but he quickly qualified that implication by reiterating that at the same
time, the associations in those cases had been unable to show the inclusion of
the unwanted individual would significantly burden the ability to express the
messages desired.78 Leaving the issue murky, the Court concluded that the law
impaired the rights of the Boy Scouts and the “interests embodied in New
Jersey’s public accommodations law [did] not justify such a severe intrusion
on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”79 Intimating,
but not explicitly holding, that the state’s interest in protecting homosexuals
from discrimination was unqualified to abrogate the group’s First Amendment
rights, the Court held that the Boy Scouts could not be compelled to admit a
homosexual scoutmaster against its wishes.80
While Dale did not make it completely clear exactly what type of groups
could succeed on an expressive association claim (particularly due to the
majority’s refusal to explicitly confirm the implied message—that the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
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protection of homosexuals does not count as a compelling interest), on close
inspection the case appears to represent at least a small step back from the
sweeping language of Hurley. First, unlike in Hurley, the majority required the
association to identify its message and how admittance of the unwanted
individual would impair that message.81 Second, the decision was far from
unanimous (unlike Roberts, Rotary, New York State Club, and Hurley), with
four Justices dissenting,82 indicating that deference to the state’s interest in
fighting discrimination had not completely dissipated. On this view, Dale
appears to be a return to Roberts rather than Hurley, despite the fact that the
decision ultimately upheld expressive rights.
E.

Law Schools Finally Get Involved: Rumsfeld

In 2006, law schools finally grappled firsthand with the issue of
homosexuality and expressive association in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc.,83 foreshadowing the impending conflict that
arose in Walker, as well as those that will likely continue around the country.
In Rumsfeld, an association of law schools, the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR), filed suit alleging that the Solomon Amendment84
violated its rights of free speech and expressive association.85 The Solomon
Amendment provided for the denial of certain federal funding to universities
that refused to grant access to military recruiters that was at least equal to the
access granted to other employers.86 FAIR objected to allowing military
recruiters on law school campuses because of the policies Congress has
adopted regarding homosexuals in the military, claiming it would force the
schools to either give up federal funds or stop enforcing their own policies that
prevented recruitment activities on campus by employers who did not comply
with the FAIR non-discrimination policy.87 Chief Justice Roberts authored the
8–0 opinion holding that the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First
Amendment and thereby did not infringe on the expressive association rights
of FAIR or its member law schools.88
FAIR argued that, similar to the situation in Dale, allowing military
recruiters on campus would impair its capacity “to express [its] message that

81. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
82. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, filed a strongly worded
and lengthy dissent taking issue with the majority’s holding that the Boy Scouts’ message would
be impaired. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 663–700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
84. See 10 U.S.C. § 983 (Supp. 2004).
85. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51. This Comment will discuss only the expressive association
claim.
86. Id. at 52–53.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 70. Justice Alito did not participate in the decision. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1262

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1249

discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.”89 The Court,
however, distinguished Dale from the facts of the instant case, saying the
Solomon Amendment did not force law schools to offer membership to those
with whom they disagreed, which had been the crux of the violation of
expressive association in Dale.90 The military recruiters, as well as any other
employer coming on campus, remained as outsiders of the law school
community, and the Court labeled this distinction as “critical.”91 Because the
“[s]tudents and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the
military’s message” and because “nothing about the statute affects the
composition of the group by making group membership less desirable[,]” the
Court held that “[a] military recruiter’s mere presence . . . does not violate
a law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school
considers the recruiter’s message.”92
Rumsfeld made the Dale decision clearer in at least one respect, showing
that despite the Court’s fairly broad level of deference to a group’s claims that
granting inclusion to certain individuals would impair its ability to spread its
message,93 there must be more to the story. At the very least, the group must
show that the inclusion complained of truly was “forced,” and that this
inclusion prevented them from adequately associating “to voice their . . .
message.”94 It was in this context that the conflict in Walker emerged.
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF WALKER
In February of 2005, officials at the SIU School of Law received a
complaint about the membership policies of the campus chapter of the
Christian Legal Society because the group did not allow active homosexuals to
hold leadership positions or become voting members.95 On or about February
16, 2005, school officials informed Winter Ramsey (Ramsey), President of
CLS at the University, of the complaint.96 CLS was then asked for a copy of
its statement of membership and leadership policies,97 and Ramsey replied in
an e-mail that included the following statement regarding CLS policies:

89. Id. at 68.
90. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68–70.
91. Id. at 69.
92. Id. at 69–70.
93. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000); supra notes 68–76 and
accompanying text.
94. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70.
95. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006).
96. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Christian Legal Soc’y v.
Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005), rev’d, 453 F.3d 853 (7th
Cir. 2006), 2005 WL 975978.
97. Id.
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The SIU Chapter of Christian Legal Society has discussed and voted . . .
[and] our membership policy is below.
All members of the national CLS . . . are required to sign a Statement of
Faith. This Statement of Faith indicates the member holds certain Christian
viewpoints . . . .
Any student is welcome to participate in CLS chapter meetings and other
activities, regardless of religion, creed, sexual orientation or member or nonmembership in any other protected class. However, pursuant to the
constitution and rules for CLS student chapters of the national CLS, members
and officers are required to sign and endeavor to live by the national CLS’
Statement of Faith.
CLS interprets its Statement of Faith to require that officers and members
adhere to orthodox Christian beliefs, including the Bible’s prohibition on
sexual conduct between persons of the same sex. A person who engages in
homosexual conduct or adheres to the viewpoint that homosexual conduct is
not sinful would not be permitted to serve as a CLS chapter officer or member.
A person who may have engaged in homosexual conduct in the past but has
repented of that conduct, or who has homosexual inclinations but does not
engage in or affirm homosexual conduct, would not be prevented from serving
98
as an officer or member.

On March 25, 2005, upon receipt and review of CLS’s statement of
policies, the Dean of the Law School informed CLS that it would no longer
receive SIU recognition due to its refusal to allow active homosexuals to join
its ranks.99 The Dean informed CLS that its refusal violated two University
policies—SIU’s Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Policy
and a policy of the SIU Board of Trustees.100 The Affirmative Action policy
stated in its relevant portions that SIU would “provide equal employment and
education opportunities for all qualified persons without regard to race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled veteran of the

98. Id. at 8–9. CLS’s Statement of Faith is as follows:
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
“One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of
the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life;
His bodily resurrection and personal return.
The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.
The Bible as the inspired Word of God.”
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 5,
2005).
99. Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 5–6, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853
(2006) (No. 05-3239), 2005 WL 3738600.
100. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Vietnam era, sexual orientation, or marital status.”101 The Board of Trustees
policy ordered that “[n]o student constituency body or recognized student
organization shall be authorized unless it adheres to all appropriate federal or
state laws concerning nondiscrimination and equal opportunity.”102
As a result of derecognition, CLS could not:
[R]eserve law school rooms for private meetings . . . was denied access
to law school bulletin boards, representation on the law school’s
website or in its publications, and the liberty to refer to itself as the
“SIU Chapter of” the Christian Legal Society. Finally, CLS was
stripped of an official faculty advisor, free use of the SIU School of
Law auditorium, access to the law school’s List-Serve, and any funds
provided to registered student organizations.103
Shortly thereafter, on April 5, 2005, CLS filed suit in the Southern District
of Illinois against SIU and law school officials in their official capacity,
alleging a violation of its rights to expressive association and free speech.104
Exactly three months later, the district court denied CLS’s motion for a
preliminary injunction against SIU that would have reinstated its official
status.105
CLS appealed the denial of its motion to the Seventh Circuit, and on July
10, 2006, the court reversed the district court’s decision, remanding the case
with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction against SIU, which would
effectively reinstate CLS as a University-recognized student organization.106
The court held that CLS had likely not violated the SIU policies and further
found that CLS was likely to succeed on its claims that SIU had violated its
right to expressive association by “revoking its recognized student organization
status” and its right of free speech by excluding it “from a speech forum in
which it had a right to remain.”107

101. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
102. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id. The court noted that CLS could have meetings on campus, but they would not be
assured of privacy.
104. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 12–15. CLS
also alleged violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment,
and violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but these issues will not be discussed here, as the majority opinion focused only on
the free speech and expressive association claims.
105. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
July 5, 2005).
106. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006).
107. Id. at 859–60.
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINION
A.

The Majority Finds Irreparable Injury and Likelihood of Success

By a 2–1 decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district
court’s denial of CLS’s motion for injunction, providing CLS with
reinstatement as an officially recognized student organization at the SIU
School of Law.108 Judge Sykes authored the majority opinion and began by
laying out the background of SIU’s relationship with its student
organization.109
SIU encourages the formation of student organizations, specifically
offering several benefits that are not available to individual students outside of
the parameters of group affiliation—access to the law school’s database of email addresses, authorization to post information on SIU Law bulletin boards,
inclusion of the group on lists of official student organizations at SIU (both in
law school publications and on the SIU’s website), the ability to reserve
conference rooms, the ability to hold meetings, storage space at the law school,
a faculty advisor, and finally, allocation of funds from the SIU budget.110 The
law school at SIU had at least seventeen officially recognized student
organizations during the 2004–2005 academic year.111
CLS is a national affiliation of law students, attorneys, and other legal
professional across the country who have united over their shared common
religious belief in Christianity.112 To be a member of CLS, one must subscribe
to the CLS statement of faith and agree to live one’s life in accordance with
particular moral values.113 The case at hand arose over one of the values CLS
members must subscribe to; namely, that sexual relations are forbidden outside
of what CLS considers the traditional forum for such activities—one man and
one woman in a monogamous, marital relationship.114 This framework for
sexual activity means CLS disapproves of fornication, adultery, and
homosexuality.115 Nonetheless, despite its disapproval of such activities, CLS
does allow any person to attend its meetings; it simply does not allow anyone

108. Id. at 867.
109. Id. at 856.
110. Id.
111. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857. The court included a partial list of the SIU Law student
organizations, naming “the Black Law Student Association, the Federalist Society, the Hispanic
Law Student Association, Law School Democrats, Lesbian and Gay Law Students and
Supporters, SIU Law School Republicans, the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund, Women's
Law Forum, and CLS.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Id at 857–58; see also Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 96, at 8–9.
114. Id. at 858.
115. Id.
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to be a member or have a vote in CLS decisions that does not approve the CLS
Statement of Faith or who engages in any of these activities without having
repented.116
The majority rejected the district court’s finding against CLS and outlined
three reasons117 CLS was likely to succeed on the merits, any one of which was
sufficient to carry its burden and merit reversal.118 First, the court was
unconvinced CLS had actually violated any SIU policy, the ostensible grounds
for derecognition.119 Second, the court found CLS had succeeded in showing
the likelihood that SIU had illegally infringed on its rights of expressive
association.120 Finally, CLS had been able to show the likelihood that SIU had
violated its free speech rights by expelling it from a forum of speech in which
it was entitled to remain.121
Turning to its first point, the majority found it “doubtful” that CLS had
actually violated any SIU policy.122 SIU first alleged CLS was in violation of a
Board of Trustee’s policy that refused recognition for any student organization
that did not comply with all federal and state laws regarding equal opportunity
and nondiscrimination, but the court found that through all the proceedings,
SIU had failed to identify a single statute which CLS had violated.123 This
failure “raises the specter of pretext; [and] . . . this asserted ground for
derecognition simply drops out of the case.”124
SIU also alleged CLS violated the University’s Affirmative Action/EEO
policy,125 which required SIU to “provide equal employment and education
opportunities . . . without regard to . . . sexual orientation.”126 The majority
was “skeptical” of any claim CLS had violated this policy because it did not
actually exclude anyone based on sexual orientation, but rather required only
adherence by its members to its belief system regarding sexual conduct.127
Because CLS believes it is sinful to engage in any sexual conduct outside the
context of marriage between one man and one woman, it refuses to offer
membership only to those persons not willing to conform their actions to this
116. Walker, 453 F.3d at 858.
117. There were numerous claims involved in the initial lawsuit that were not addressed in the
appeal but have not been waived and thus could be decided upon remand. Id. at 860 n.1.
118. Id. at 859.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Walker, 453 F. 3d at 859–60.
122. Id. at 860.
123. Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for the relevant language of the Board of
Trustees’ policy.
124. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860.
125. Id. See supra note 101 and accompanying text for the relevant language of the
Affirmative Action/EEO policy.
126. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860.
127. Id.
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belief, regardless of whether the sexual actions are of a homosexual or
heterosexual nature.128 In fact, CLS interprets its membership policies to allow
a person of “homosexual inclinations” to be a member, so long as they do not
participate in or condone sexual activity (presumably either heterosexual or
homosexual) outside of marriage, and since this is the exact same requirement
to which a heterosexual must adhere to become a member, the policies enable
CLS to treat all prospective members in the same manner.129 The court also
noted there was no language in the SIU policy prohibiting distinctions based
on belief or conduct rather than upon personal status.130
The court also found other reasons to be skeptical of SIU’s claims about
the policy violations. First, since CLS does not employ anyone, the court was
not convinced that the Affirmative Action/EEO policy even applied to it.131
More importantly, the court relied on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia132 to hold that affiliated (even if subsidized) student
organizations engage only in private speech and are not conduits of a
university’s message, and thus the CLS was not a “mouthpiece . . . for the
university.”133 Relying on all of these reasons, the court concluded that CLS
was likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.134
The court then turned to an analysis of the second issue—whether CLS
was likely to succeed on the issue of expressive association. The majority
cited Dale for the proposition that there is “no clearer example of an intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire,”135 and also reiterated
that the freedom to associate “plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.”136 The court also reaffirmed, however, that the Constitution does
not prohibit laws that limit rights of expressive association if such laws can
survive strict scrutiny.137 To make its determination of whether CLS’s rights
had been infringed by SIU, the court analyzed three questions: “(1) Is CLS an
expressive association? (2) Would the forced inclusion of active homosexuals
significantly affect CLS’s ability to express its disapproval of homosexual

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860.
132. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (interpreting the Establishment Clause and holding that a state
university could not withhold funding from a student publication based on the religious content
and views of the publication).
133. Walker, 453 F.3d at 861.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
136. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts,
468 U.S. at 623)).
137. Id. at 861–62 (internal citation omitted).
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activity? and (3) Does CLS’s interest in expressive association outweigh the
university’s interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals?”138
The answer to the first question was fairly apparent in light of the broad
standard applied to this question in Dale139—CLS is an expressive
association.140 The court explained that CLS is an expressive association
because it
is a group of people bound together by their shared Christian faith and a
commitment to “[s]howing the love of Christ to the campus community . . . by
proclaiming the gospel in word and deed” and “[a]ddressing the question,
‘What does it mean to be a Christian in law?’” Members must dedicate
themselves to the moral principles embodied in CLS’s statement of faith; one
of those principles is affirmance of “certain Biblical standards for sexual
morality.” CLS interprets the Bible to prohibit sexual conduct outside of a
traditional marriage between one man and one woman. As such, CLS
disapproves of fornication, adultery, and homosexual conduct, and believes
that participation in or affirmation of such sexual activity is inconsistent with
141
its statement of beliefs.

In light of CLS’s shared expressive conduct, the court concluded that “[i]t
would be hard to argue—and no one does—that CLS is not an expressive
association.”142
The answer to the second question—would the forced inclusion of active
homosexuals significantly affect CLS’s ability to express its disapproval of
homosexual activity—was more contentious, but the court did not find the
issue to be complicated, saying that to even ask the question was “very nearly
to answer it.”143 As such, the court “ha[d] no difficulty concluding that SIU’s
application of its . . . policies . . . burdens CLS’s ability to express its ideas.”144
Because “CLS’s beliefs about sexual morality are among its defining values;
forcing it to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual
conduct would cause the group . . . to cease to exist.”145 Further, since one of
its specific values is that sexual conduct outside the scope of marriage between
one man and one woman is sinful, “[i]t would be difficult for CLS to sincerely
and effectively convey a message of disapproval of . . . [such] conduct if, at the
same time, it must accept members who engage in that conduct.”146

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Walker, 453 F.3d at 862.
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
Walker, 453 F.3d at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
Id.
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As SIU’s derecognition violated CLS’s expressive association rights, its
action would have to survive strict scrutiny, and the court was forced to
analyze if SIU’s interest in stopping discrimination against homosexuals
outweighed CLS’s interest in expressing disapproval of homosexual activity.147
The court willingly accepted that a state has an interest in curbing
discriminatory conduct, as well as in ensuring equal opportunity to access of
educational benefits, but it also reiterated that these interests cannot “be
applied to expressive conduct with the purpose of either suppressing or
promoting a particular viewpoint.”148
On this front, the court sided squarely with CLS:
What interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept members whose
activities violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing particular
beliefs contained in that creed? SIU has identified none. The only apparent
point of applying the policy to an organization like CLS is to induce CLS to
149
modify the content of its expression or suffer the penalty of derecognition.

In contrast to this language strongly disapproving of SIU’s interest in
regulating CLS, the court noted that CLS’s interest in effecting its
constitutional rights was “unquestionably substantial”150 because the “First
Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not.”151
Further, “public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s
expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to
accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization’s expressive message.”152 Consequently, since SIU presented no
compelling interest, its policy could not survive strict scrutiny, and CLS once
again had shown a likelihood of success on the merits for its claim of
expressive association.153
Additionally, the majority rejected the claim that the SIU policy did not
amount to a “forced inclusion” case such as Hurley or Dale.154 The dissent
contended this was not a forced-inclusion case at all; rather, CLS remained free
to prohibit those who do not share its beliefs from becoming members—it
simply could not do so on SIU’s dollar.155 The majority assumed, however,
that Healy controlled on this issue and that derecognition itself turned the
application of the policy into a forced-inclusion case because “the Court [in

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 863–64 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 864.
Id.
See Walker, 453 F.3d at 873–74 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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Healy] . . . drew a distinction between rules directed at a student organization’s
actions and rules directed at its advocacy or philosophy; the former might
provide permissible justification for nonrecognition, but the latter do not.”156
The court ruled that the present case was “legally indistinguishable” from
Healy and thus there was little doubt CLS had presented a forced-inclusion
claim or that it should prevail upon it.157
At that point, the majority turned to its analysis of the free speech claim.
The CLS claim was that the government violates the First Amendment when it
“excludes a speaker from a speech forum the speaker is entitled to enter.”158 It
argued SIU had created such a forum for its student organizations, and
derecognition effectively expelled them from that forum even though there was
no compelling reason justifying the action.159 The court found that SIU had
created a public forum for its student organizations,160 and the label given to
the forum was not vital to the legal conclusion because even under the standard
of review most favorable to SIU, CLS still had “the better of the argument.”161
CLS’s argument on the free speech violation triumphed because, even
though SIU’s policies were neutral on their face, there was evidence they had
been applied in a way that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.162 The
court explained:
Once the government has set the boundaries of its forum, it may not
renege; it must respect its own self-imposed boundaries.
....
. . . According to the present record evidence, CLS is the only student
group that has been stripped of its recognized status on the basis that it
discriminates on a ground prohibited by SIU’s . . . policy. CLS presented

156. Id. at 864 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted).
157. Id. The dissent distinguished Healy by saying the difference was that the student
organization was not even allowed to meet on the university’s campus or coffee shop, whereas in
the present case CLS could still meet at school and had other ample alternative channels for
communicating with each other. Id. at 874 (Woods, J., dissenting). While the point of this
Comment is not to discuss the difference between forced-inclusion cases and the mere refusal to
provide a forum for a group’s speech, Healy strongly suggests the Supreme Court does not favor
the dissent’s analysis on this issue. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (“[P]ossible
ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities
imposed by [nonrecognition].”).
158. Walker, 453 F.3d 865, 865 (internal citation omitted).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 866 n.2 (“Accordingly, while the parties appeared to agree at oral argument
that we are probably dealing with a ‘limited public forum,’ we will not hold them to that
agreement because they were plainly arguing for different levels of scrutiny and the ‘forum’
terminology has not always been clear.”).
161. Id. at 866.
162. Id.
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evidence that other recognized student organizations discriminate in their
membership requirements on grounds prohibited by SIU’s policy. The Muslim
Students’ Association . . . limits membership to Muslims.
Similarly,
membership in the Adventist Campus Ministries is limited to those “professing
the Seventh Day Adventist Faith, and all other students who are interested in
studying the Holy Bible and applying its principles.” Membership in the
Young Women’s Coalition is for women only . . . .
For whatever reason, SIU has applied its antidiscrimination policy to CLS
alone . . . . SIU contends there is no evidence that other groups would continue
to discriminate if threatened with nonrecognition, but that argument is a
nonstarter. SIU’s . . . policy, which SIU insists applies to all student
organizations, is a standing threat of nonrecognition; assuming it applies, that
163
is the whole point of the policy.

The majority conceded that a final decision on the reasonableness of the
policy was not appropriate since the actual purposes of the policy had not been
fully argued.164 And while the court acknowledged that the record was
“spartan” on SIU’s purposes for the speech forum, it asserted that was not
dispositive since CLS was able to show a likelihood of success on its claim
that SIU applied the policy in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner,165 intimating
that SIU’s purposes (whatever they may be) would not be able to withstand the
inevitable standard of strict scrutiny review that accompanies such regulations.
Having analyzed all three reasons CLS was likely to succeed on the merits,
the court concluded by balancing the harms. Weighing in favor of CLS, the
court reiterated that CLS had shown irreparable harm since a First Amendment
violation always constitutes such injury, and reaffirmed that the controlling
precedent of Healy held that “denying official recognition to a student
organization is a significant infringement of the right of expressive
association.”166 Further, the court concluded that as CLS had shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of the free speech claim, “[o]ne way or the
other, CLS has shown it likely that SIU has violated its First Amendment
freedoms.”167
Weighing against SIU, the court first noted that the district court had
misread the standard of irreparable harm, which by itself necessarily
constituted an abuse of discretion.168 Further, SIU had been unable to
demonstrate they would incur any harm whatsoever beyond “the hardship

163. Walker, 453 F.3d at 866–67 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 867.
165. Id. The dissent objected to the decision to rule on the free speech claim since the record
was admittedly incomplete. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
166. Walker, 453 F.3d at 867.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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associated with being required to recognize a student organization it believes is
violating the university’s antidiscrimination policy.”169 This harm did not
suffice, however, as CLS had demonstrated likelihood of success on its claims
that SIU had violated its First Amendment rights—since SIU’s claimed harm
was predicated on an interest that violated the constitutional rights of CLS,
such harm was in fact “no harm at all.”170 Thus, because SIU would sustain no
harm upon a grant of the injunction and CLS would incur irreparable harm
upon its denial, the court reversed and remanded the decision of the district
court, ordering that the preliminary injunction be entered against SIU.171
B.

The Dissent

Judge Wood dissented from the majority,172 opining that the decision was
only “possible . . . by asking the wrong questions, and thus arriving at the
wrong answers.”173 Taking the record as it stood,174 the dissent disagreed that
CLS had carried its burden, arguing it failed to show a likelihood of success on
the merits of any of its claims and it failed to show it would suffer irreparable
harm outweighing the harm that SIU would incur upon reversal.175
First, Judge Wood rejected the majority’s distinction between
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and sexual conduct.176 His
primary contention was that there was no support or opposition in the record
for the idea that CLS would or had actually allowed a homosexual who chose
not to be sexually active to be a CLS member or leader, or that heterosexuals
who participated in non-marital sexual conduct had ever been or would ever be
prevented from CLS membership or leadership capabilities.177
Next, Judge Wood argued CLS had not shown a likelihood of success on
its claim that SIU had violated its rights of expressive association because the
case at hand was distinguishable from Dale and Healy.178 He differentiated
Dale by saying the present case was not one of forced inclusion because SIU

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Walker, 453 F.3d.at 867.
172. Id.at 867–76 (Wood, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 867.
174. Judge Wood’s first contention was that much of the majority opinion was based upon a
record that was far too incomplete to support the decision. See id. at 869. Due to the state of the
record, Judge Wood argued that it was “virtually impossible to evaluate the Law School’s action
with respect to CLS without knowing whether it conforms or not to the treatment of similar
organizations.” Id. at 870. As such, he argued that the temporary injunction should be dissolved
so that SIU could enforce its policies until the case was decided in full on the merits. Id. at 867.
175. Id. at 872.
176. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 873.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 873–74.
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did not force CLS to accept anyone like the statute in Dale would have forced
the Boy Scouts to do; rather, SIU had “simply declined to give certain
additional assistance (financial and in-kind) to organizations that violate its
nondiscrimination policy.”179 He also argued the situation was quite different
from the events in Healy because SIU had not banned CLS from meeting on
university grounds and because technological advances since the 1970s
enabled CLS to maintain a campus presence outside of the scope of official
university recognition, one that was not available to the challengers in
Healy.180
Finally, Judge Wood turned to the balancing of the harms.181 While
conceding that CLS had a valid interest in its rights to expressive association,
he also found that nothing SIU had done directly impeded those rights, and any
indirect effects were “mild.”182 Further, the dissent found SIU had very
important interests at stake. First, SIU had a compelling interest in obtaining a
diverse student body, and a decision that required them to include
discriminatory groups “might undermine their ability to attain such
diversity.”183 Second, relying on dicta from Grutter v. Bollinger,184 Judge
Wood argued SIU itself had compelling expressive association and free speech
interests in preventing CLS from spreading its message, so its harm “at the
least, must be balanced against the harm to SIU from being forced to accept
into its expressive association a group that undermines its message of
nondiscrimination and diversity.”185

179. Id. at 873–74 (Judge Wood failed to respond to the majority’s contention that
derecognition goes beyond a mere “failure to fund.”).
180. Id. at 874.
181. Judge Wood also refused to accept the majority’s finding that CLS had shown a
likelihood of success on its free speech claim, primarily because the state of the record was too
incomplete to show SIU had applied its Affirmative Action/EEO policy in a discriminatory way.
Id. Specifically, he found the constitutions of the other student organizations that had been
offered as evidence were “too weak a reed on which to rely” and with the lack of other evidence,
the court had “no way of knowing whether those organizations were actively discriminating on a
prohibited basis.” Id.
182. Id. at 875.
183. Id.
184. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
185. Walker, 453 F.3d at 875–76. Judge Wood distinguished this argument from the similar
argument that failed in Rumsfeld, see supra, notes 92–94 and accompanying text, by noting that
the law schools in Rumsfeld were trying to exclude outsiders whose speech was not a part of the
school’s expressive association, whereas here, CLS was effectively attempting to force the school
to accept the speech of someone who would be an “insider.” Thus, while the Solomon
Amendment would not force a school to accept a member it does not desire to have among its
ranks, a holding for CLS would do so. Walker, 453 F.3d at 876.
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IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WALKER
A.

What Can Law Schools Do?

A central question remaining after Walker is what the decision, and the
Dale-era of expressive association in general, means for the many public law
schools in America that wish to fight discrimination against homosexuals in
their student organizations. In light of the recent decisions in Hurley, Dale,
and Rumsfeld, the addition of Walker likely spells a great deal of trouble for
the types of inclusive policies schools such as Southern Illinois University
have hoped would ensure a welcoming and open educational environment for
all of their students.
In this Author’s opinion, until the Court is prepared to recognize
discrimination against homosexuals as a compelling interest,186 law school
policies that force student groups to include individuals as members whom
they do not wish to embrace will, in all likelihood, see results similar to those
in Hurley, Dale, Rumsfeld, and Walker, rather than the inclusive mandates of
Roberts, Rotary Club, and New York State Club.
The remainder of this Comment is predicated upon the contention that
Walker (combined with the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence outlined
above) stands for the idea that expressive organizations that can prove their
message will be impaired by including homosexuals as members have a First
Amendment right not to admit such individuals. With this view on the state of
the law, the remainder of this Comment attempts to determine how public law
schools can endeavor to stop discrimination against homosexuals in their
student organizations without violating the First Amendment.
1.

A New Approach is Necessary

The majority in Walker acknowledged that a public university has an
interest in ending discrimination in its student organizations.187 The court
restricted the reach of that interest, however, holding that no antidiscrimination
policy can be applied to an expressive organization if the purpose of the policy
is to suppress or to promote any one particular viewpoint.188 A state is free to
promote the ideas it wishes, but it cannot do so by “interfer[ing] with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the

186. The Author makes no prediction as to when or if this will occur. Even Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Dale, the Supreme Court writing most willing to extend protection to homosexuals on
this issue, stopped short of explicitly finding homosexuality to be a compelling state interest. See
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663–700 (2000).
187. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
188. Id.
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government.”189 The Seventh Circuit stated that SIU could not identify a
single purpose for forcing CLS to include homosexuals as members beyond
SIU’s simple disagreement with its views about the rights of homosexuals and
SIU’s hopes for “eradicating or neutralizing” such beliefs.190
Clearly, the court in Walker felt SIU was interfering with protected speech
purely because it disagreed with the message of that speech. This
understanding causes a huge problem for law schools, because the truth in
many cases is likely that the court was exactly right. Many schools would
probably admit that they completely disagree with the viewpoints of groups
that discriminate against homosexuals, and that they do not want to allow
student groups to express such a message on their campus. This is almost
exactly what FAIR argued in Rumsfeld.191 Since the Supreme Court has failed
to recognize the protection of homosexuals as a compelling state interest,
however, the frank reality is that this interest simply is not good enough. No
school will be able to promote the kind of tolerance and inclusiveness it wishes
when its argument boils down to the fact that it dislikes the message the
challenging group wishes to send.
A new approach is necessary. Schools need to focus their efforts in a
different direction. Instead of being dedicated purely to a one-sided, legislative
attack on the eradication of conflicting viewpoints, schools need to find ways
to make conversations about discrimination a two-way street, one upon which
all viewpoints are allowed to travel. If free speech in universities truly is to
operate in the marketplace of ideas,192 schools must realize they are merely a
powerful market force, not the holders of a monopoly on the public discourse
inside the hallways of America’s institutions of higher learning.

189. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68
(2006) (“FAIR argues that the Solomon Amendment violates law schools’ freedom of expressive
association. According to FAIR, law schools’ ability to express their message that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong is significantly affected by the presence of military
recruiters on campus and the schools’ obligation to assist them.”).
192. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . .
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution.”); see also Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University
Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882,
2884–85 (2005) (“The real marketplace of ideas operating at practically every public university .
. . is actually more likely to be located in the university’s forum of student organizations than in
its classrooms.”) (internal citation omitted).
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This means that a respect for the free speech rights of all students is
necessary.193 In a world where might does not make right, the way to make
headway in fighting discrimination will be to change people’s minds,
particularly by encouraging students to interact with people whose views do
not match their own. In other words, the First Amendment should not be seen
as a barrier to a school’s inclusive goals—indeed, quite the opposite. The First
Amendment itself can be the instrument for effecting inclusion and equality—
the First Amendment in all its forms—debate, discussion, and co-existence.
The remainder of this Comment will focus on ways for universities to
encourage the acceptance of homosexuals, not merely by respecting the First
Amendment rights of all, but by utilizing the powers afforded by the First
Amendment itself to effect important changes.
2.

Legislative Methods For Fighting Discrimination Will Prove Unviable
Because Viewpoint-Neutrality is a High Hurdle

The right to expressive association is not an absolute right.194 The state
can pass a law that infringes on this right, but such a regulation will be subject
to strict scrutiny.195 However, the analysis above shows that the type of antidiscrimination policies employed in Walker are hardly on solid legal ground,
and satisfying strict scrutiny will be unlikely. Schools need to realize that if
they are currently employing anti-discrimination policies that apply to student
organizations which prevent them from keeping homosexuals out of their
groups, those policies are likely to be challenged as unconstitutional. As such,
schools need to consider other ways to promote their interests.
In a legal universe where homosexual rights do not constitute a compelling
state interest, there are two alternative approaches. The first, one that would
appear to be difficult to bring to fruition, would be to find a purpose for ending
the discrimination that is not related to viewpoint. The second, which would
seem to be more viable, would be to find ways of promoting the viewpoint and
messages that a school embraces without violating First Amendment rights by
interfering with the message a particular student organization wishes to
articulate.
In the context of universities, legislative alternatives to fighting
discrimination, while perhaps not altogether unworkable, are limited in utility
for two major reasons. First and most obviously, the purpose of eradicating
discriminatory viewpoints, quite simply, exists.196 Many schools will want to

193. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.”).
194. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Walker, 453 F.3d at 861.
195. Walker, 453 F.3d at 861–62 (internal citations omitted).
196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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get rid of discriminatory viewpoints simply because they disagree with them,
and this is not a legitimate reason for interfering with the right of association.
When this illegitimate purpose remains in the background, any other purpose
(no matter how legitimate) that accomplishes the same goal will automatically
be suspect. Any public university that finds a justifiable purpose unrelated to
viewpoint for forcing inclusion of homosexuals in a student organization
would still have to litigate the same battles regarding the illegitimate purposes
that could account for the forced inclusion. Further, the challenging group will
have just as strong a claim to the exercise of its First Amendment rights as it
would in a more explicit attempt to legislate based on viewpoint. In light of
the case law discussed within this Comment, such a battle is all but ensured of
ending in a loss for the school.
The second reason finding a purpose unconnected to viewpoint is so
difficult is related to the first, but deserves its own treatment. The problem
here is that it seems highly unlikely that viewpoint can ever be entirely
divorced from legislation aimed at ending discrimination against homosexuals.
Because the Supreme Court has never found homosexual rights to be a
compelling interest, any attempt to limit a group’s right to exclude
homosexuals is inherently expressing a viewpoint—that discrimination against
homosexuals is wrong, and those who think it is not should be stopped from
promoting their message.
Viewed in this light, it may seem the only difference between
discrimination against women and discrimination against homosexuals is that
the Supreme Court has found the women’s cause to be compelling and has not
for homosexuals. It is unlikely that Roberts, Rotary, or New York State Club
would have come out any differently even if any of the claimants had a more
powerful argument that the exclusion of women was a vital part of their
expressive message that could not be expressed as well if women were among
the group’s members. Perhaps not even Alfalfa and his He-Man Women
Hater’s Club of Little Rascals fame could succeed on a claim of expressive
association in the twenty-first century. Put simply, women’s equality is now
considered a more important interest than First Amendment rights of
association, but it would be hard to argue that policies aimed at promoting the
inclusion of women are actually devoid of viewpoint discrimination.
Walker illustrates this second point nicely. While it would appear at first
glance that a public law school’s interest in equal access to educational
opportunity for all of its students is a viewpoint neutral purpose for a policy
prohibiting discrimination, the Walker majority explicitly rejected that precise
argument. The court found that, “[c]ertainly the state has an interest in
eliminating discriminatory conduct and providing for equal access to
opportunities. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that antidiscrimination
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regulations may not be applied to expressive conduct with the purpose of either
suppressing or promoting a particular viewpoint.”197 In other words, the
majority refused to distinguish the motive of equal access to educational
opportunities from viewpoint discrimination.198
Still, because the Walker court did not reject outright the idea of equal
access to educational opportunity as an important interest, there may be
seemingly plausible ways of getting around the viewpoint-neutrality barriers
facing a school that wishes to prevent discrimination against its students. A
derivative version of the SIU policy challenged in Walker that would come
closest to eliminating concerns about its viewpoint-neutrality would be a
blanket prohibition on discriminatory membership policies, one that did not list
any protected categories of people. A policy requiring every recognized
student organization to allow anyone who wanted to join to be accepted as a
member would be facially neutral and would be very easy to apply evenhandedly. Of course, such a law would still be subject to strict scrutiny
because it would force some groups to associate with those they do not wish to
in violation of their right to expressive association. However, the school could
mount a much stronger argument that it had a compelling interest unrelated to
the suppression of ideas with a policy that was applicable to all student
organizations and all classes of students if it was neutral on its face. In the
end, however, this sort of plan does little in the way of avoiding litigation since
it would impinge the rights of every single student group with less than fully
open membership policies.199 It also does nothing to promote open debate
rather than coercion through forced silence, a First Amendment value that
should be at the forefront of a school’s concern.200
A more experimental approach a school could take would involve an
attempt to shift the underlying focus of its anti-discrimination policy.

197. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863 (internal citations omitted).
198. Id. at 858. Because the SIU policy in Walker specifically mentions sexual orientation as
a protected category, however, Walker probably should not be read unequivocally to stand for the
premise that policies aimed at equal educational opportunity are always viewpoint based. The
SIU policy guaranteeing equal educational opportunities does explicitly mention “sexual
preference” as a protected category against discrimination, but it also includes the categories of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a veteran of the Vietnam Era,
and marital status, implying that the difference between viewpoint discrimination and viewpoint
neutrality often comes down to little more than whether or not the protection of a particular
category of people constitutes a compelling governmental interest.
199. See Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University Antidiscrimination
Policies and Religious Student Organizations, supra note 192, at 298–99 (explaining how many
groups’ very existence depend on the ability to discriminate in membership, even if the person
being discriminated against enjoys protected status or is exercising a constitutional right).
200. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.”).
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Basically, a school would argue its policy is not aimed at viewpoint; it is aimed
at the societal harm that discrimination against homosexuals inflicts. Insight
into this idea can be gained from a somewhat unlikely source—feminist
criticism of pornography—as seen in the famous obscenity case American
Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut201 and the scholarly criticism it
provoked. Hudnut involved an Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance that
was struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment in a
Seventh Circuit opinion written by Judge Frank Easterbrook.202 The law,
drafted in large part by renowned feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon,203
was quite novel. It made no reference to the general obscenity standards such
as prurient interest, offensiveness, or standards of the community,204 but
instead aimed to prevent only pornography that debased the equality of
women.205
The law was struck down as unconstitutional for several reasons, but one
of its fatal shortcomings was that it tried to eliminate this type of pornography
by labeling it “low value,” while at the same time arguing it could be regulated
because it “influences social relations and politics on a grand scale, that it
controls attitudes at home and in the legislature.”206 Judge Easterbrook
rejected this argument as precluding itself.207 The fact that pornography had
the power to perpetuate the subordination of women “simply demonstrates the
power of pornography as speech.”208 The power to influence attitudes proves
speech has value, and since our “Constitution forbids the state to declare one
perspective right and silence opponents. . . . the government must leave to the
people the evaluation of ideas.”209 Implicitly, Judge Easterbrook’s contention
about the power of pornography seems applicable to the power of the message
that homosexuality is not an appropriate lifestyle, and this in turn is the reason
legislation against such speech is so often rejected as an attempt to suppress the
conveyance of ideas.
Embedded in Indianapolis’s argument, however, was the idea that
pornography should be legislated against purely because of the harm it
produces. Criticism of the Hudnut decision elicited support for this claim, with
scholars arguing that such a law was constitutional because

201. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
202. Id. at 324, 332.
203. See id. at 325.
204. Id.
205. Id. In all, the Indianapolis ordinance prohibited six enumerated types of pornography
involving the “sexually explicit subordination of women.” See id.
206. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 329.
209. Id. at 325, 327.
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[t]he legislation aimed at pornography as defined here would be directed at
harm rather than at viewpoint. Its purpose would be to prevent sexual violence
and discrimination, not to suppress expression of a point of view. . . . Because
of its focus on harm, antipornography legislation would not pose the dangers
210
associated with viewpoint-based restrictions.

A school could try to make take this argument by applying it to the social and
educational harms of discrimination against homosexuals. Of course, there are
major obstacles, not the least of which is that the argument has never been
successfully made. Further, Professor Cass Sunstein notes that one of the
major advantages of the argument in the context of pornography is that the
government would have “concrete data to back its legitimate purposes,”211 an
advantage a law school would not likely have on the issue of educational
discrimination against homosexuals, data that would be difficult and expensive
to obtain. There is also criticism of such an approach. For example, Professor
Laurence Tribe argued that the distinction between harm and viewpoint was
superficial and that “[a]ll viewpoint-based regulations are targeted at some
supposed harm, whether it be linked to an unsettling ideology . . . [or] to
socially shunned practices.”212 In light of all these impediments, this option
does not seem particularly viable at present, but is certainly an interesting
proposal that might be worthy of further exploration, especially as social
science data emerges relating to these issues.
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning the necessity of neutrality in the
application of the non-discrimination policies that do exist. It would be naïve
to assume that every public law school will eliminate policies similar to SIU’s,
since many schools will still seek to keep specific language regarding sexual
orientation in their non-discrimination policies, regardless of the implications
of doing so after Walker. This being the case, it should be noted, though it is
seemingly obvious, that if a school insists on keeping policies similar to SIU’s,
every student organization needs to be held to the same standards.
The Walker court took special note of arguments by CLS that other student
organizations at SIU that held or applied exclusionary membership policies
were never threatened with derecognition, saying this was “strong evidence
that the policy has not been applied in a viewpoint neutral way.”213 CLS
complained about this treatment, and the court held that SIU’s response to
these claims—”there is no evidence that other groups would continue to
discriminate if threatened with nonrecognition,”—was a “nonstarter.”214 As

210.
(1986).
211.
212.
213.
214.

Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 612
Id.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 925 (2d ed. 1988).
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
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the court observed, the very point of having the policy is for it to act as a
standing threat of derecognition to any student organization that is unwilling to
comply.215
It should be clear that any law school insisting on keeping similar policies
should not, for any reason, apply them haphazardly or unevenly. There is
simply no rationale for inviting the legal battles likely to ensue, beyond the
even more obvious considerations of promoting fairness and honesty in policymaking. Even if a law school could find a court that would be open to
disagreement with the decisions in Walker or Dale, a substantial problem
remains if other student organizations are allowed to break the policy being
challenged without repercussion, and the school would stand to lose an
important legal triumph. There is simply no straight-faced way to argue that a
policy is not aimed at viewpoint if it is not applied neutrally and evenhandedly.
In the end, while it may not be impossible, finding a viewpoint-neutral way
of legislatively promoting homosexual rights in opposition to the First
Amendment rights of those who wish to express views hostile to the inclusion
of homosexuals is certainly a daunting task. In light of the hurdles detailed
above, and the possibility that an interest in equality of educational opportunity
may not be good enough, it may not be worth the energy and costs involved
with making an argument for a school’s interest in promoting tolerance or
inclusiveness. Thus, in a legal universe where homosexual rights do not
constitute a compelling interest and in which little possibility exists for an
antidiscrimination policy that proves viewpoint-neutral, we must look
elsewhere for a means by which law schools might successfully end
discrimination against homosexuals in their student organizations.
3.

Value-Promotion Without Infringement—Effectively Using the First
Amendment To Promote Tolerance

A second alternative—finding ways to promote a public law school’s
interest in ending discrimination against homosexuals in their student
organizations without impinging on a group’s First Amendment rights—is
legally plausible, in this Author’s opinion. The following analysis will attempt
to outline basic plans a law school could take to promote a message of
inclusivity, along with some possible legal and practical implications of such
actions. This analysis is animated by the conviction that the law school should
always attempt to promote its values without impinging on the beliefs and
rights of any of its students.

215. Id. at 86.
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Tailoring Policy Language Towards Inclusiveness

One possibly feasible (but complicated) alternative would be for a law
school to attempt to tailor a policy to the exact holdings of Dale and Walker.
Such a policy would read (rather cumbersomely) that “No student organization
may refuse membership to any person on any basis that would not interfere
with the organization’s ability to exercise its First Amendment rights.” This
sort of policy would technically allow an organization to express its message,
but to do so it would have to ensure its organizational policies were shaped to
meet the burden of proving why accepting a particular person would infringe
on its rights. One of Justice Stevens’s major arguments in his dissent in Dale
was that the Boy Scouts had not proven that keeping homosexuals out of its
midst affected its ability to express its message.216 While it is unlikely certain
faith-based organizations (such as CLS) would have as difficult a time proving
this as did the Boy Scouts in Dale,217 the balance is shifted towards more
inclusive interests when the group asserting the right has a burden of proving
that its message will actually be impaired by inclusion of homosexuals. Still,
at least two major obstacles stand in the way of a policy of this sort. The first
relates to a potential legal deficiency, and the second to a concern over the
intended function of the judiciary.
First, a policy such as outlined above would clearly be subject to
vagueness challenges. Vagueness is a consideration of procedural due process
that aims to ensure people or entities are aware of the criminal consequences of
their actions by providing a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”218 A law or
policy that is void for vagueness is one where a person “of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application . . . .”219 The example policy statement laid out above would likely
be vague because an organization probably could not be expected to
understand exactly where the line should be drawn as to which exclusionary

216. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 685 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens writes “[a] State’s antidiscrimination law does not impose a ‘serious burden’ or a
‘substantial restraint’ upon the group’s ‘shared goals’ if the group itself is unable to identify its
own stance with any clarity.” Id.
217. CLS had a stronger case in this respect than did the Boy Scouts, as evidenced by the
sparse treatment this subject received in the Walker opinion. This is nowhere more apparent than
in the fact that the dissent in Walker limits its discussion of the expressive association claim to an
argument that SIU did not require the CLS to accept anyone instead of claiming the CLS was
unable to show the admittance of a homosexual to its membership would impair its message. See
Walker, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J., dissenting).
218. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951). The doctrine is not applied
exclusively to criminal statutes. Rather, it applies to statutes or policies that involve a “penalty.”
See id. at 231.
219. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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policies are necessary to express its message and which policies would not
interfere with its expressive message, without more guidance than is given in
the example policy statement. Since the whole point of this type of policy
would be to avoid the pitfalls of viewpoint discrimination that more concrete
direction would entail, adding any guiding details may defeat the purpose and
supposed benefits of this strategy.
Second, such a policy would create a very real concern over questions of
judicial function; most importantly, it may be no part of a judge’s role to
determine the subjective belief of an organization concerning whether the
inclusion of an individual impairs its First Amendment rights. This view of
judicial function is one that sees a court’s job as entailing the duty to make a
legal determination of whether a group’s rights have been infringed. Nothing
in that function involves a hunt for how sincere or consistent a group’s belief
is, though that should obviously play a role in the determination of how
seriously the challenged statute impinges upon the organization’s rights. This
is precisely the argument Chief Justice Rehnquist made in Dale when
preaching deference to a group’s claim that its rights have been infringed upon:
The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts’ beliefs and
found . . . that the exclusion of members like Dale “appears antithetical to the
organization’s goals and philosophy.” But our cases reject this sort of inquiry;
it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they
220
disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.

Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to state that an inquiry to “determine the
nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality” was not
necessary,221 and that they could not “doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely
holds this view.”222 While Justice Stevens clearly did not accept this
argument,223 his dissent failed to distinguish between adjudicating how
seriously a challenged law impinges on a group’s rights in the context of strict
scrutiny review, which is clearly a relevant determination,224 and passing
judgment over what amounts to little more than an organization’s subjective
belief that it has a cause of action.

220. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–51 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 651.
222. Id. at 653.
223. For just one example, see id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote,
“The evidence before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that BSA has, at most, simply
adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has no shared goal of disapproving of
homosexuality.” Id.
224. Because one of the prongs of the strict scrutiny test is whether the state’s interest can be
“achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” the strength of
an organization’s claim will directly affect how closely tailored the law must be to restrict the
least amount of associational freedom possible. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d
853, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2006).
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In light of these objections to an imprecise and indefinitely worded policy,
it would seem that despite its obvious benefits, such a choice may lead to
litigation that would result in the invalidation of the policy as vague, and a
different path should be utilized.
b.

University-Endorsed Campaigns For Tolerance

One option to limit discrimination against homosexuals that could clearly
be employed without violating expressive rights would be for a law school to
take an active stance and campaign for its own views on open membership
without actually requiring groups to abide by those views. There is absolutely
nothing that would prohibit a school from exercising its own First Amendment
rights by voicing its own opinions on the benefits of open and nondiscriminatory student organizations.
The Walker majority noted that a school is free to “promote all sorts of
conduct in place of harmful behavior.”225 We see government advocate
particular opinions as better than other views all of the time without passing a
law that holding the alternative viewpoint is illegal, whether through television
commercials urging college football fans to send their children to their favorite
university or billboards advocating the purchase of toll road passes for quicker
and easier travel on the state’s highway systems. Each of these promotes a
course of conduct as preferable to other alternatives, which inherently involves
a statement that a particular way of thinking is also preferable to another—
University A offers a better learning environment than does University B, it is
better to not have to stop at a toll booth and search for change than it is to do
so—but neither requires someone to articulate a message they do not wish to,
and thus these promotions do not violate rights of expressive association.
Law schools do this sort of thing all of the time. What school does not
have hundreds of advertisements in its hallways for job opportunities it views
as worthy of obtaining or does not hold workshops expressing its view of the
best method of impeaching a witness? There is simply no reason a public law
school could not, and should not, choose to advocate what it feels to be a
proper viewpoint—that student organizations should have open membership
policies and that discrimination against homosexuals is improper. As such,
schools should consider hosting lectures, debates, and discussions that promote
an interest in non-discrimination. This choice violates the rights of none and
advances persuasion as a method for changing attitudes rather than coercion.

225. Id. at 863 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
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Of course, many schools may wish to do more than merely promote their
own viewpoint, and there is at least one substantive, legislative method of
furthering such goals whereby a public law school could implement a policy
advancing its desires for reducing discrimination against homosexuals in its
student organizations without violating First Amendment rights.
Perhaps the best substantive policy option is the idea that a school could
likely enforce a regulation requiring all student organizations to allow anyone
who is a member of the school to attend group meetings, so long as the school
does not force the group to offer membership to those who do not affirm the
group’s shared message (an “open-attendance” policy). While this was not
precisely the controverted issue in Walker, the decision implicitly supports the
idea that merely allowing someone who does not agree with or affirm a student
organization’s beliefs or policies to attend a meeting does not interfere with the
group’s rights of expressive association.226
The Walker court held, “When the government forces a group to accept for
membership someone the group does not welcome and the presence of the
unwelcome person ‘affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate’
its viewpoint, the government has infringed on the group’s freedom of
expressive association.”227 Read literally, this language supports the argument
that if the government is not forcing a group to accept members it does not
wish to recognize, no rights of expressive association have been violated.
The rhetoric in Dale lends itself to the same argument—that a group is
never stopped from promoting its message simply because someone who
disagrees is present. The Court focused purely on forced inclusion in a group’s
membership: “Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the
ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends
to express.”228 This, too, suggests a group’s rights are only hindered when it is
forced to enroll unwanted individuals as official members.
This argument for open attendance hinges on the idea that non-members of
a group do not share in the group’s collective identity and thus have no voice
in expressing the group’s message. For all intents and purposes, such
individuals are no different than any other person in the world. Any message
that individual expresses, whether explicitly through words or implicitly
through actions or identities, is his or her message alone.229 At least two

226. Id. at 861. The court uses language specific to forced membership in explaining why
mandatory inclusion is a violation of the First Amendment: “When the government forces a group
to accept for membership someone the group does not welcome. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
229. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. In Rumsfeld, FAIR tried to challenge
this notion and the court unanimously rejected FAIR’s contention. It specifically stated that the
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contentions support this conclusion—the rejection of the theory that “mistaken
belief” regarding a group’s message by outsiders constitutes a violation of the
First Amendment, and repudiation of any differentiation between outsiders
who attend a group’s meeting and outsiders who do not.
First, the possibility that mistaken belief by outsiders as to what the
message of a group actually is should not be considered ample grounds to
support a claim for violation of expressive association. This claim has already
been implicitly rejected in First Amendment jurisprudence. Directly on point
is Dale (a case protecting and arguably expanding the rights of expressive
association), which noted only that including unwanted individuals as
members kept a group from promoting “those views, and only those views, that
it intends to express.”230 This arguably amounts to a rejection of the idea that
allowing mere attendance sends any message at all. Further support is found in
Hurley, even though the likelihood of mistaken belief must seem inherently
present, and the Court discusses that exact possibility.231 The reality is that the
case did not turn on such a contention. The parade organizers did not win
because the presence of outsiders held the potential to send a message they did
not wish to express—they won precisely because their presence actually did
send such a message.232 Thus, in this Author’s opinion, Hurley was much
different than mere attendance at a group’s meetings; it amounted to the
bestowing of a de facto membership upon individuals the association did not
wish to include. This is strong proof that the attendance of nonmembers at a
group’s private meetings does not send any message and has no bearing on a
group’s rights of expressive association.
Second, a distinction between the speech of non-member attendees and
non-member, non-attendees is superficial. An outsider who has no share in the
control of a group does not become an insider merely by attending meetings.
If the only benefit of membership in a group could be obtained through
attendance at meetings, it is unlikely the group is organized around expressing
a message as defined by the Court in Dale, and thus, would not be entitled to
the protection of expressive association.233 No one would argue that the
speech of a non-member of a group who has never attended that particular

Army’s presence at a school did not impair the law schools’ message. By analogy, a law school’s
message should not effect a student organization’s message.
230. Id.
231. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
575 (1995) (“GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the
Council’s customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was
worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”).
232. Id. at 576 (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a
speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy
over the message is compromised.”).
233. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648–50.
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group’s meetings or had any real association with the group amounts to speech
by the group. When the only difference between outsiders and their
relationship to a group is attendance at meetings, there is no real difference at
all.
To be sure, there is room for argument against a policy that would require
open attendance. Issues such as privacy, discriminatory application of policies,
and violation of a group’s potential rights of intimate association are beyond
the scope of this discussion, but there are some concerns worth referencing in
further detail.
First, open attendance, while certainly a step towards heightened
inclusivity, does not achieve exactly what many schools will actually desire—
the potential for full inclusion of all students in all educational opportunities.
For example, the CLS policies in Walker would actually permit open
attendance.234 Related to this, the level of interest students would show in
attending the meetings for groups of which they cannot become members, who
do not share their values, and who do not actually desire their presence, is
certainly uncertain.
Most importantly, there are other ways a group could still mount an
expressive association claim. Whenever the government interferes with the
internal affairs or structure of an association in a way that impairs the group’s
ability to expound its message, a potential violation of its right to expressive
association is at hand.235 It is not hard to imagine a scenario where the
attendance of non-members at meetings could impair a group’s ability to
express its message apart from any of the concerns discussed previously. To
mention a few possibilities, it could become significantly more difficult to
conduct group meetings in an orderly fashion, or members might feel less
camaraderie or trust in the organization and be afraid to express opinions that
might be viewed as unpopular by those not espousing the group ethos. Further,
forced inclusion has never been viewed as the only infringement upon
expressive association,236 and it is not completely implausible that open
attendance could be added to the list.
Despite these concerns, open attendance is an attractive option for schools
desiring to take a proactive approach to making their student organizations
more inclusive. Open attendance goes far in meeting a school’s goals of
student-group equality without violating the First Amendment rights of those
students, thus satisfying what should be two paramount objectives of any law
school. While the prospect of litigation always remains a possibility, a school
wishing to legislate against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation

234. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006).
235. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
236. Mazzone, supra note 19, at 651–55.
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would have a defensible position with an open-attendance policy, unlike many
of the options outlined above.
4.

What Should Law Schools Do?

In light of the above discussions, it is this Author’s belief that it will not be
possible to completely eradicate discrimination against homosexuals among
student organizations in public law schools without violating the First
Amendment in a legal landscape where sexual orientation does not constitute a
compelling state interest. The simple truth is that the relevant Supreme Court
case law since Healy has only protected the expressive association rights of
women and groups who are trying to prevent homosexuals from becoming
members. With these thoughts at the forefront, it is this Author’s contention
that the best method of fighting discrimination in public law school student
organizations is for schools to adopt an open-attendance policy similar to the
one described above, combined with a prominent public campaign of
university-endorsed speech promoting the school’s preference for equality and
inclusivity among its student organizations.
It is possible to promote a school’s interest in inclusiveness without
violating the First Amendment, and this should be every school’s goal. If one
believes that First Amendment rights “acquire a special significance in the
university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views
is essential to the institution’s educational mission,”237 then it is hard to support
any plan where the price is abrogation of expressive rights. Further, none of
the activities and freedoms protected by the First Amendment could be
“vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed.”238 Thus, as important as equality of opportunity is to the
educational environment of America’s public law schools, a dynamic
protection of the First Amendment rights of its students is of even greater
consequence.
The acceptance, or potential acceptance, of homosexuality in the
mainstream of American culture, should not be enough to force those who
disagree to give up their First Amendment rights. As stated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in the majority opinion of Dale:
Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained greater societal acceptance.
But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment protection to
those who refuse to accept these views. The First Amendment protects
expression, be it of the popular variety or not. . . . And the fact that an idea
may be embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the

237. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
238. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)
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more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice
239
a different view.

Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us that the First Amendment is not subject to
the changing viewpoints on what constitutes popular morality in America.
In the environment of America’s public law schools, these words are
difficult to contextualize. Law schools often consider themselves to be the
starting point of social change and enlightenment, but they also almost
certainly believe themselves to be the ultimate protectors of the First
Amendment. Added to this dilemma is the fact that both sides of the issue see
themselves as the minority voice, a voice so many law schools consider to be
the most worthy of protection. It is this predicament that makes the fight
against discrimination in student organizations so difficult, but this is also what
makes the solution offered here so viable. Schools need to balance their desire
for inclusivity with a healthy respect for the First Amendment rights of every
student, and this combination affords them the chance to do both. By adopting
the open-attendance policy, they maintain the requisite deference to the First
Amendment while legislating against what they consider unacceptable
behavior, and by endorsing a campaign of their own speech, they put their
money where their mouth is. The message this sends is that the school
believes discrimination against homosexuals is wrong, but instead of simply
banning dissenting opinions and coercing compliance, they are relying on
success through the merit of their argument, a concept critical to the
educational mission of any law school—that of winning advocacy.
Admittedly, the situation here is tricky, and the First Amendment does not
always provide easy answers, but Justice Brandeis once explained how this
pivotal freedom should operate:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . . [T]hey
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy
for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of

239. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted).
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governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
240
assembly should be guaranteed.

Perhaps the answer to the problem of discrimination in student organizations is
not as clear as we might like, but the open-attendance policy respects Justice
Brandeis’s vision of the core meaning of the First Amendment. Public law
schools should feel free to promote their viewpoints and legislate to enforce
them, but they must never do so at the cost of their students’ rights, for such a
price threatens to bankrupt the First Amendment, surely a tragedy of great
magnitude.
CONCLUSION
Christian Legal Society v. Walker confirmed that the Dale-era of
expressive association continues to govern litigation between state attempts to
prevent discrimination against homosexuals and the private associations that
wish to prevent homosexuals from being a part of their groups. Public law
schools across the country need to realize that until the protection of
homosexuals is considered a compelling interest, they will likely not be able to
stop most of their student organizations from discriminating against the
school’s homosexual students merely by the use of a nondiscrimination policy.
The open-attendance policy outlined here, combined with an active campaign
of university-endorsed speech advocating tolerance, provides these schools
with a viable method for promoting their interests while maintaining a healthy
respect for the First Amendment rights of each of their students. This is a
balance that will never be easy to strike, but in a time where so many
American students with different values and viewpoints must coexist with one
another, it is imperative that schools do whatever they can to ensure their
students have every available means of striking the balance between First
Amendment rights and tolerance.
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240. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations
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